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Title of Thesis: An Economic Analysis of the Use of Expendable 
Light-Weight Air-Launched Practice Torpedoes 
in the U. S . Navy 
Douglas Wilkinson Payne, Master of Arts , 1968 
Thesis directed by: J. Lawrence Hexter, Ph.D. 
NeilS. Weiner 
This thesis develops and exercises the methodology to assist 
the decision-maker in evaluating the present day concept of air -
launched torpedoes in the U.S. Navy from an economic standpoint . 
It investigates the present recoverable t orpedo doctrine with a 
view toward the most effective allocation of resources . 
The paper examines characteristics of the present system and 
that of an alternative system of expendable practice weapons as 
well as a third alternative of mixed types of practice weapons. 
Results of the analysis are presented as total cost vs effectiveness 
and marginal cost vs effectiveness curves. This provides the 
decision-maker with the comparisons he requires as a bas is f or 
selecting the most economically efficient of the alternatives f or 
diff erent levels of output or effectiveness. 
Sensitivity t es t s are carried out t o determine the effect of 





















The study results provide to the decision-maker the most 
efficient choice available t o him over the spectrum of output 
but does not provide data as a basis of an noptimumn solution . 
Such an optimality decis i on can only be determined by the decision-
maker himself with the higher level political or military considera -
tions that he brings i nt o the problem. A cost benefit analysis 
must have limited objectives. It is designed t o provide the 
dec i s i on -maker with the best information available so as to make 
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A major and continuing problem in any military weapon system is 
the manner in which peacetime weapon proficiency is maintained s o 
that i n wartime the weapon will provide the military power it i s 
designed to produce. Submarines may be attacked by aircraft, surface 
ship or by other s ubmarines in a variety of ways, but in all cases a 
primary offens ive anti-submarine weapon is the t orpedo . Air and 
surface units both use the identical torpedo in anti-submarine warfare 
(ASW) operations. 
In order to maintain a weapons proficiency and wartime firing 
capability in submarine attack, naval units practice in peacetime 
with a recoverable "exercise" torpedo . The exercise torpedo is 
identical to the wartime torpedo, except that the explosive head or 
warhead is removed and replaced by an inert exercise head of equal 
buoyancy. Regardless of the type torpedo or the type launching 
vehicle, the basic concept of a recoverable and reuseable weapon 
remains. Air launched torpedoes are recovered by Torpedo Retrievers 
(called 11 TR" boats) or by destroyer or destroyer-type sh ips . 
Torpedoes launched by surface ships or submarines are picked up by 
the firing ship herself or by other TR or destroyer-type vessels . 
The Navy faces a similar consideration in the use of the se 
practice torpedoes as does a firm attempting to maximize profits 






















the Navy has considered th is problem within the analytic framewr~rk 
of an economic analysis . Being economi c does not mean do ing t he 
objective regardl ess of cost, or conversely it does not mean 
reducing expenditures regardless of the objectives . Economics i s 
concerned with allocating r esources --resources that are in scar ce 
supply and have conflict ing demands upon their utilization . 
The Navy has a l ways r ecovered her exercise t orpedoes . The 
nature of the recovery process , h owever, imposes some latent cost 
~-on the tra i ning rece ived. Bas ically, the requirements are f or 
I 
~l 
daylight , good visibility and relatively calm s eas in or der t o 
permit a safe recovery of the weapon and s uch condit i ons are the 
ant ithes i s of expected ASW conditions i n wartime . As a re sult 
pil ots and dest r oyermen remain unpracticed and untested under the 
most probable attack conditions. This i s the type environment 
in which the entire weapon system mus t provide i ts maximum de s igned 
military effectiveness . 
The co s t s associ a t ed with the concept of t orpedo recovery 
and reuse are high and i n s ome cases hidden . For exampl e , the 
investment cost of each of the Navy's TR boat s and as sociated on -board 
equipment is one -half a million dollars . The cost t o refurbish a 
s ingle torpedo is $900 and even under idea l l aunch conditions some 
l 20 per cent of the torpedoes fired are expended or lost anyway . 
1 Quarterl~ 
Weapon Researc 
196 3 -1966. 
Status of Torpedo Firings, U. S. Naval Underwater 





















Because of the apparent cost and operational disadvantages of 
the present recoverable torpedo concept, it seems well worth 
investigating an alternative expendable-type torpedo t o see what 
such a concept might offer in reduced cost and increased operational 
advantages. This paper will address an approach to a cost 
effectiveness analysis comparing the present air-launched torpedo 
t o a comparable expendable torpedo. A relationship between output 
(squadron combat capability), and the number of torpedo firings 
conducted, will be tested as a measure of effectiveness (MOE) of 
torpedo utilization in terms of squadron capability. A discounted 
stream of costs for the present t orpedo and the expendable alternative 
at different firing levels will be determined so that total cost 























The basic methodology f ollowed is the consideration of the 
t orpedo problem as one of scarce resource allocation analogous 
to the selection of the least cost production process of the firm 
in producing a product, its output. For the profit max imizing firm, 
the problem is approached by using the firm 1 s production function 
which relate s output levels t o levels of factor inputs for each 
production process. Given this production function and the cost 
relationship f or the factor inputs, a function can next be derived 
which gives the total cost associated with various levels of output . 
A comparison of these total cost curves for each production process 
demonstrates which process is the most ttefficienttt, that is, the 
least t otal cost for a particular level of output. In order f or 
the firm t o determine its ttoptimumtt level of output, the marg i nal 
cost and consumer demand functions are required. The firm 
interested primarily in max imizing the difference between output 
and cos t (i.e. profit maximization) determines its optimum l evel 
of output at that production point at which margi na l cost and 
margina l revenue are equal. 
In attempting to evaluate military systems in this manner, 
two problems are present. First, the military system has no 
market-type mechanism f or the determination of a consumer demand 





















output or effectiveness generally cannot be. The concept of 
profit maximization has no meaning if output cannot be measured 
in terms of dollar values as is cost . This cannot be done in 
the vast majority of military systems. 
At this point the analogy for the determination of resources 
allocation for defense systems and the private sector differs . 
To determine optimal output the firm equates marginal cost and 
marginal revenue, but the military system (having no easily 
5 
derived or expressed demand curves) must depend upon value judgments 
of a higher level decision-maker to determine the level of output. 
In economic analysis, the military analyst can present the total 
cost and marginal cost relationships so that for any desired level 
of output the most efficient alternative can be determined . Stated 
equivalently, at any predetermined output the least-cost alternative 
can be selected. Selection of either the desired cost level or 
the desired output is an input following the analysis that must 
be provided by the higher level decision-maker. Most often the 
military systems analyst must be satisfied to provide to the 
decision-maker the spectrum of costs at various output levels so 
that the decision-maker will have the best available information 
f or his choice. 
The basic methodology in step form is as f ollows: 
l. Determine a production function relating input to 
a measure of effectiveness or output . 
2. Select alternative production processes; 




















3. Compute system cost streams for each alternative 
solution in terms of resource costs. 
4. Develop Output vs Total Cost relationship for 
each alternative and Output vs Marginal Cost 
relationsh ip f or each alternat ive . 
5. Due to the uncertainties in many of the assumptions, 
conduct a series of sensitiv ity tes t s t o ascertain 
the significance of variations in the analysis 
parameters. 
Before examining these steps i n more deta i l, it would be 
6 
wise to digress to be certain the problem contains the essential 
element of an economic analys i s . These elements are described 
by E.S. Quade1 as follows: 
"1. The objective . Systems analysis is undertaken 
primarily to suggest, or at the very least, to 
help choose a course of action. This action 
must have an a i m or objective . Po l icies or 
strategies , forces or equipment are examined, 
compared, and prefer red on the basis of how 
well and how cheaply they can accomplish the 
aim or objective. 
l 
2. The alternatives. The alternatives are the 
means by which it is hoped the objectives can 
be attained. They need not be obvious substitutes 
or perform the same specific function. 
3. The costs. Each alternative. means of accomplishing 
the objectives implies the use of specific resources 
which cannot then be used for other purposes. 
E. S. Quade (ed.), Analysis for Military Decisions 






















The model. The model is a representation of the 
s1tuat1on under study designed to predict the 
cost and performance of each alternative . It 
abstracts the relevant features of the situation 
by means which may vary from a set of mathematical 
equations or a computer program to an idealized 
description of the situation in which judgment 
alone is used to assess the consequences of 
various choices. 
A criterion. A criterion is a rule or test 
ny which one alternative can be chosen in perference 
to another. It provides a means for using cost and 
effectiveness to order the alternatives. 11 
With these concepts in mind, we can describe the t orpedo 
problem in these same terms. 
The objective is the highest combat effectiveness of the Navy's 
anti-submarine aircraft squadrons for a given cost. This means to 
attain the highest capability in the ASW squadron t o carry out its 
assigned mission which is : To search, locate, identify, track, 
and if required, destroy submarines . 
The alternatives selected to meet the objective are two types 
of torpedo concepts: The recoverable torpedo (referred to here -
after as REC), and the expendable torpedo (referred to hereafter 
as EXP). 
The costs incurred by each alternative are substantiated in 
Chapter IV. 
The model is determined in Step 1 and Step 3 of the basic 























The criterion will be established in Step 4 and Step 5 
with the development of total cost and marginal cost curves and 
the sensitivity analysis . This will provide the decision-maker 
with the level of cost for the range of effectiveness for each 
alternative. 
Let us return now for a closer examination of the five 
steps of the methodology. 
1. The production function . What is ideally desired is 
the relationship between some measure of effectiveness and resource 
inputs. The resource input in this case i s the number of torpedoes 
dropped in peacetime practice exercises . The measure of effective-
ness (MOE) must fulfill two basic requirements. It must be first, 
relevant to the mission of the system being considered, and 
1 
second, measurable. The MOE des i red is an ASW squadron's combat 
capability which is not a measurable factor under most peacetime 
conditions. The MOE which was sel ected as a suitable substitute 
is the measure of an ASW squadron's peacetime capability; the 
squadron readiness score. These readiness scores are primarily 
based upon pilot performance in various anti-submarine exercises 
and are extremely competitive since they are the basis for 
annual squadron efficiency awards. How peacetime readiness scores 
relate to squadron combat capability is not known. For purposes 
of the study, a one for one correspondence will be assumed without 
damage to the basic concepts involved in the analysis . 
1William A. Niskanen, U.S. National Securit 
the Choice of Measures of E ectiveness, Internal 





















2. Alternatives. As discussed previously, the scope of 
the analysis has limited the alternatives to two basic concepts. 
The recoverable air-launched torpedo concept (REC) compared to 
the expendable t orpedo concept (EXP). 
3. Cost streams. The systems costs for each alternative 
will be fully discussed in Chapter IV. 
4. Choice criterion. The curves of Readines s (Effectiveness) 
vs Total Cost and Readiness vs Marginal Cost are developed to 
provide to the decision-maker the best information available 
t o a s sis t h i m i n decisions on output level. The t otal cost 
curves will demonstrate which system is least costly at each 
level of output. The decision-maker then may select the most 
efficient system subject either to a cost constraint (i.e. 
maximizing effectiveness for a given budget) or an effectiveness 
constraint (at a given effectiveness, minimizing the dollar cost). 
Both a pproaches are analytically equivalent. 
Marginal cost curves provide to the decision-maker the 
incremental costs associated with incremental changes in the 
effectiveness measure. While marginal cost information is 
not direc t ly used in the determination of efficiency, it is 
an important adjunct to the total cost curves and is useful in 
examining effectiveness comparisons with other Naval units 



















5. Sensitivity. Once the total and marginal cost curves 
are derived, the curves must be analyzed with regard to their 
sensitivity to value judgments involved in key input parameters 
and assumptions. Sensitivity tests are conducted on the 
following parameters: 
a. Planning period 
b. Discount rate 
c. Basic torpedo cost 
Basic Assumptions 
In view of the importance to the analysis of the basic 
assumptions, they are discussed in the final section of 
methodology. 
10 
I n any analysis one of the primary driving f orces is the 
initial assumptions made for the study. It is vital, therefore , 
that the assumptions be made clear at the onset. If the real 
world of the decision -maker dramatically differs from the 
scenario of the study, he is better able to adjust for these 
differences knowing precisely what the initial study assumpt i ons 
are. 
For the purposes of the study, the REC t orpedo consis ts 
of a head, control section and afterbody section. During 
peacetime training exercises, the explosive head is replaced 
with an exercise head which contains telemetry equipment t o 
determine the precise run of the torpedo, whether or not it 




















torpedo at the completion of its run. The air-launched weapon 
must be accurately placed in the water by the launching aircraft 
relative to the submarine position. It is parachute retarded , 
actively (with sonar) hunts the submarine in a helical pattern , 
and once acquisition of the target is established, homes in on 
the target. Characteristics , performance and reliability of the 
expendable alternative (EXP) are assumed to be comparable t o the 
REC . 
11 
Trade-offs between these two alternatives are readily apparent . 
The EXP has no launch restrictions so that it can be used in any 
ASW training exercise, under any conditions. This increase in 
training realism should provide some increase i n pilot attack 
capability, although such an increase is accepted as an immeasurable 
quantity. The REC has rather severe launch restrictions . It i s 
limited by the relatively calm sea conditions necessary f or a 
safe torpedo retrieval. Conditions of daylight and an on-the - scene -
recovery vessel are two additional requirements. Other trade-offs 
exist due to the fact that the REC can monitor its own run and 
provide performance information which is useful in design and 
performance trouble-shooting . The EXP cannot. In order to 
alleviate this apparent drawback in the EXP, let us examine the 
EXP furth er. 
The EXP concept involves the production of a weapon for 
ASW in much the same manner as a round of ammunition. Since it 
would be constructed for one firing only, cost savings are 




















strength requirements that go int o such par ts as i ts power plant 
and guidance sections. A shell of equa l buoyancy, for example, 
\ ~could be substituted for the cos t l y exerc i se head. Throughout 
\ 
~ 
the weapon, savings could be expected by substituting cheaper 
materials perfectl y suitable f or a one - shot practice weapon which 
is not intended for repeated uses a s i s the REC. No change in 
basic torpedo design is assumed , so that a mi n i ma l additional 
research and development expenditure is required. 
The weapon would be completely assembled for launching at 
the factory, and except for shel f t ests would require no spec i al 
tests prior to launch. Des pi te the reductions in cost per torpedo 
that would result, additional cost s would be incurred in order to 
provide a sample test i ng of t he production out put to maintai n 
torpedo reliability at the approx imate operational level presently 
existing for the REC. 1 Such t es t and evaluat ion would be above 
that level of testing presentl y required with the REC . 
Hit information provided by either weapon is approximately 
equivalent. In the REC the monit or t e l emetry equipment confirms 
the hit or confirmation comes from actua l t arget contact. The 
~EXP hit confirmation is by actual contact onl y. Wh{le this 
restriction will prevent use of the EXP on a target not fitted 
with baffles to protect the ship 1 s s crews , this same restriction 
is in effect for REC utilization today. 
1The precise torpedo reliability figure is classified but 






















Thus, there are relevant trade -offs between operational 
restrictions and between torpedo monitor information for the two 
types of torpedoes. While these trade-offs must be considered 
by the decision-maker, they do not enter into the effectiveness 
calculations nor the costing data . Any bias from these assumptions 
is intended to be in favor of .the present system. 
Additional assumptions made f or the analysis are as follows : 
l. Total cost of the REC is $15,000 which includes 
basic procurement costs of the entire exercise 
configured torpedo (exercise head, main assembly, 
and accessories ). Although the precise cost of 
procurement is classified , the $15 , 000 figure 
is sufficiently accurate for the analysis. 
2. 
oj ~~~[ 
-z_ , C? () 
Total procurement cost f or the EXP is $10,600.~ ~v 
This assumption is further clarified in the chapter 
on cost. 
3. A failure rate (resulting in torpedo los s ) will be 
assumed to be 20 per cent for the REC. In the 
case of the EXP 20 per cent of the firings will 
be considered no-hit failures due t o torpedo 
r eliability. 
4. No costs are incurred for destroyer-type recovery 
of torpedoes; that is, that under the present 
system, a surface or air firing which is recovered 
by surface warships is done at no dollar cost due 
to the fact that the assumed opportunity costs for 
the warship and her manpower and equipment f or a 
one-hour recovery operation are zero. Recovery 
























these costs are fixed costs independent of the 
level of firings. At no firing levels considered 
feasible is the TR capacity exceeded and the 
purchase of additional TR boats required. The 
life span of a TR is 15 years so that TR replace-
ment is assumed minimal . A capital expenditure 
of $500,000 ·a piece is required for replacement 
of two of the thirty . craft each year. 
No addit i onal REC torpedoes are purchased during 
the planning period. This is not as limiting an 
assumption as it might first appear since the 
present stockpile will permit annual total 
firing levels of 4500 torpedoes for 10 years, 
which is well above anticipated needs. 
REC torpedoes remaining in the inventory on the 
completion of the planning period have a salvage 
value based upon exponential decay. 
Hit data provided by telemetry in the REC is 
provided by the target in the case of the EXP. 
Run data a lso provided automatically by the REC 
is assumed unnecessary for the EXP since the 
concept accepts the increased costs associated 
with a test and proof program prior to delivery 
to maintain the 80 per cent reliability figure 
of the REC. 
The EXP is assumed to require only limited research 
and development costs since no changes in torpedo 
technology are called for. Those research and 
development costs required are considered incurred 
























The REC is a joint weapon f or both aircraft and 
ASW surface ships. Any f uture weapon is likely to 
be a j oint weapon also. For this reason a constant 
level of surface firings (destroyer type) are 
assumed throughout the analysis and the level of 
aircraft firings is allowed to vary on top of 
this surface firing level. This is true for all 
alternatives considered. 
This study used t he t h ree ba s i c t ypes of a i rcraf t 
squadrons that are employed in ASW work. In the 
Atlantic Fleet data on all t hree types was available 
and was used. These types are: 
l. VPL - Atlantic - based pat rol plane squadron 
2. VSL - Atlantic -based carrier ASW squadron 
3. HSL - Atlantic -based helicopter ASW squadron 
In the Pacific Fleet data on only two types of 
squadrons was available . These types are: 
l. VPP - Pacific-based patrol plane squadron 
2. VSP - Pacific -based carrier ASW squadron 






















CHAPTER I I I 
MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The establishment of a valid production function is one 
of the most difficult steps of the analysis . Here must be 
specified the relationship between input to the process and 
output. Ideally, larger amounts of squadron training would 
result in higher squadron ASW capability and the more complete 
and realistic the training, the great er t he impact of training 
on capability. The culmination of an ASW exercise in a nsimulatedn 
tropedo drop would seem to lose some measure of its reality and 
training value, since the exercise resul ts are critically dependent 
upon how the pilot conducts his attack on the submarine. 
The output measure of an ASW squadron is taken to be the 
peacetime nreadinessn score. Here squadrons are evaluated on 
their ability t o carry out their mission by a common seni or 
and are under a strong competitive stimulus each yea r f or an 
award based on these readiness scores. Although inputs include 
such diverse items as the numbers of pl ane commanders , the amount 
of day and night carrier landings, and the amount of i ns trument 
hours and total flight hours, the score is primarily based upon 
operational performance of the squadron i n certain competitive 
























The thesis of the paper concerns the construction of 
this production function--what inputs in relation to torpedo 
expenditures are significant in the determination of the readiness 
output of an ASW squadron. Stated differently, to increase 
squadron readiness, what would be the anticipated new torpedo 
drop rate associated with the change? 
In order to determine the strength of the relationship that 
exists between readiness and torpedo expenditures, a statistical 






per cent torpedo hits per squadron 
number of torpedo firings per squadron per year 
number of torpedo firings per squadron per 
aircraft per year 
The analysis was performed to determine what influence these 
variables have on squadron peacetime readiness scores. Both 
semi-log and total-log type regress ions were computed using 
data for the 3-year period, September 1963 through September 
1966, on land -based and carrier-based ASW fixed-wing and 
helicopter . squadrons. The Harvard Economic Research Project 




















Dummy variables were inserted in the regression analysis 
in or der to isolate differences in measurement between the 
Atlantic Fleet Units and Pacific Fleet Units . An obvious bias 
existed in the readiness figures depending upon type of squadron 
and geographic locale. 
This bias was eliminated by using x1 , X2 , X3 , X4 and X5 
as dummy variables as follows: 
xl = {~ if Pacific-based patrol squadron (VPP) otherwise 
x2 = {~ if Pacific-based carrier ASW squadron (VSP) otherwise 
x3 = {~ if Atlantic-based patrol squadron (VPL) otherwi se 
x4 = {~ if Atlantic-based carrier ASW squadron (VSL) otherwise 
xs 
= {6 if Atlantic-based helicopter ASW squadron (HSL) otherwise 
The HTW Program was run on an IBM 7094 computer. I n all, 
18 
98 separate regressions were computed (excluding s t ep regressions) 
on either squadron readiness or the log of squadr on readiness 
as the dependent variable. Separate r egressions were r un on the 
data separated by years (1964, 1965, 1966), and separated by 
type squadron and geographic location (such as patrol planes 
Atlantic or patrol planes Pacific). 
One would expect intuitively f or increased torpedo 
expenditures to result in increased squadron readi ness . One 
would also anticipate diminishing marginal returns in terms 




















some level of torpedo expenditures, further increases should 
result in no appreciable readiness change. Plots of portions 
of the data confirmed these expectations. For these reasons 
semi-log and total-log transformations were favored f or the 
regression f orm in order to assimilate the asymptotic properties 
of the production function. 
Nevertheless , three problem areas in the determination of 
the production function remain: 
l. Misspecificati on - the form of the relationship 
may be misspecified. 
2. Omitted variables - variables that go t o make up the 
readiness score are admittedly absent in the proposed relation -
ship. The proposed regression, however, is attempting to 
demonstrate that f or a desired change in readines s there should 
be a necessary corresponding change in the rate of t orpedo 
expenditures associated with the new readiness level. 
3 . Errors in measurement - although the readiness score 
may l ook deceptively precise on the surface, it is composed 
of the value judgments of (hopefully) impartial exercise 





















Five result i ng r egression equat ions are lis t ed below: 




:R2 = . 43 R = . 67 d f = 93 
Readiness = 55 . 1X1 + 63 . 8X2 + 65. 8X3 + 73.6X4 + 65. 0X 5 
( 3 .3 ) ( 3 .1) (2 . 8) ( 3 . 0 ) ( 3 . 5) 
+ . 6X6 + 10. 8X9 
( 2 . 9) ( 2 . 4) 
Run 211 (without dummy variables) 
R = . 38 
log Readiness = 1 .8192 + .006 35X 8 
(. 011) (.00146 ) 
Run 221 (wi t hout dummy variables) 
R = .35 
log Readiness = 1.80 75 + .0764X9 
( . 014) (.01895 ) 
Run 251 
R2 = .45 R = .64 
d f = 98 
d f = 98 
df = 94 
log Readiness 1. 7578X1 + 1.8199X2 + 1. 8288X3 + 1.8761X4 
( . 014 ) (.013 ) (.013) ( .013) 
+ 1 . 8238X5 + . oo5ox8 





















5. Run 261 
R2 = .44 R = .64 
21 
df = 94 
log Readiness= 1.7440X1 + 1 . 8096X2 + 1.8185X3 + 1.8652X4 
(.016) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
+1.8141X5 + . 0632X9 
(.019) - (.016) 
Neither exogenous variables x6 or x7 show s ignificance 
in the regress i on analysis. This is believed due to the fact 
that data consist s primarily of instances of squadron drops in 
a low range. In this range of drops , one additional success 
or failure generally caused a large proportional change in the 
per cent of hit figure, hence x6 tended to fluctuate widely. 
The coefficient and standard error figures of x6 in Run 137 
are typical and x6 and x7 were found not to have a significant 
determination effect on squadron readiness capability for t he 
data available. 
Multicollinearity is present between the explanatory 
variables x8 (torpedo firings per squadron) and x10 (torpedo 
firings per squadron per aircraft) due t o their close inter-
relationship. The mul ticollinearity is demonstrated in Runs 
117 and 118 in Appendix A. Run 117 is a regression on x8 
and Run 118 is the next step regression which adds x10 to the 
explanatory variables. Variable x8 is i nitially significant 
in Run 117, but with the addition of x10 the level of influence 
of x8 changes (the coefficient jumps from .8 to 2.3) and x10 




















at the 5 per cent confidence level . The number of t orpedo 
firings per squadron (X8) is significant at the 5 per cent 
level on both runs. The likelihood that x8 would have a 
positive influence on readiness and x10 have a negative influence 
in the same expression does not appear reasonable and cannot be 
intuitively supported. The variable x8 , therefore, is considered 
a more desirable regression variable than x10 . 
Regression attempts on the cross-section data separated 
by year or by squadron type did not prove very satisfactory. 
The 1964 data shows characteristically low R2 values often 
below .05 and with non -significance of the non-dummy variables. 
This is probably caused by the dearth of data available for 1964 
and the resulting low degrees of freedom. Run 192 in Appendix 
A is a sample regression of the 1964 data . 
The 1965 and 1966 data is characterized by higher R2 and 
R2 values (in the .6 range), but generally with non-significance 
of the non-dummy variables. When the variables do demonstrate 
significance, the R2 , R2 values fall to the .2 range. Run 117 
in Appendix A is a sample of the regressions obtained on 1965 
22 
or 1966 data. Attempted regressions on data by type squadron 





















11Whenever, for the attainment of a fixed level of an 
objective, we seek to minimize the drain upon the input resources 
because they have value to the attainment of objectives elsewhere, 
we seek to minimize the real costs. By real costs we mean the 
value of the alternative objectives that are sacrificed. 11 1 
Since comparative economic real costs cannot be explicitly 
derived in defense systems analysis, es timated money costs of 
the two systems are utilized as an effective yardstick of 
comparison. The computation of dollar cost is used as an approxi-
mation of the economic real costs involved in aggregating the 
systems cost of the alternatives. 
The following general rules for the treatment of time 
distributed expenditures are used in the cost analysis phase: 
1. The initial year of the planning period is the first 
year that expenditures for the torpedo system might be influenced 
by the analysis. Fiscal 1969 is the initial year of the planning 
period. The choice of a planning period is primarily determined 
by the expected service life of the system under consideration. 
The expected service of a torpedo varies considerably, but in 
the past torpedoes have remained in service use anywhere from 
10 to 15 years or longer. A planning period of 10 years is 
1 Malcolm W. Hoag, Operations Research, Vol . 4, No. 4, 





















a s sumed for the REC and EXP torpedoes in an attempt to minimize 
the uncertainties of end period values. 
2. Any assets avail able at the beginning of the planning 
period are valued at their highest marketable value in an 
alternative use. Similarly, any assets available at the end 
of the planning period are valued at their value in continued 
operation or in some alternative use, whichever is higher. 
3 . Whatever expenditures are necessary to maintain the 
physical condition of assets and to provide replacements for 
expected at trition are added to the operating costs in the years 
the expendi tures are made or anticipated. 
4. The salvage value of a military asset maintained in a 
constant physical condition throughout the planning period is 
based on a constant exponential decay based upon the expected 
service life of the asset. 1 
5 . An interest rate of 10 per cent is used to aggregate 
the time distributed costs of the program. 
I n amplification of the procedure of discounting used 
in the cost analysis, consider the plant manager of a firm with 
funds under his direct control . Each $100 which he controls 
today is equivalent to $110 one year from now (assuming a 
1William A. Niskanen, A Suggested Treatment of Time-
Distributed Expenditures in Defense Systems Analysis, (Internal 
Note N-396(R), Arlington, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, 





















10 per cent interest rate) and conversely an obligation of $110 
a year from now is equivalent to a $100 obligation today. 
Similarly, an obligation of $259 ten years from now is 
equivalent to a $100 obligation today, assuming a constant interest 
rate of 10 per cent. There are various ways in which the plant 
manager might invest the prese~tly available funds of the firm. 
He can obtain at least the going market interest rate for the 
use of these funds. Thus, in making investment decisions he must 
consider the expected rate of return as well as the time period 
in which the investment will take place in determining the total 
cost to him. 
The procedure used to make the future costs occurring at 
different future times equivalent is t o weight future costs 
according to a fixed interest rate so that all costs can be 
stated in terms of present value of the dollar. The present 
value of the stream of dollar costs spent in year t is: 
T 
Present Value = L 
t=O 
where Ct is dollar costs in year t and r is the interest r ate . 
This present value is a measure of the opportunity cost of the 
funds presently available; that is, the marginal productivity 
of capital. 
The government is in a precisely analogous position to 
the firm. Some future cost in year 10 of $25 9 is valued at 





















yield the $259 in 10 years, assuming a constant 10 per cent 
interest rate. The demand for present capital must be charged 
at least the rate representing the market evaluation of the 
marginal productivity of capital. 1 
The interest rate of 10% represents the total cost to the 
government from government borrowing activity and is somewhat 
26 
higher than the interest rate on government bonds. The borrowing 
rate is adjusted for the additional personal i ncome taxes gained 
on the interest payment and for the personal and corporate income 
taxes lost from the reduction in private capital formation. 
2 10 per cent is computed as follows: 
Government Borrowing Rate 
Personal Income Tax on Interest 
Corporate Taxes Foregone 
Personal Income Taxes Foregone 
+4.7% 
-1. 6% 
+4 . 6% 
+2.0% 
+9.7% 
The categories of the cost analysis are broken down as 
follows: 
A. Research and Development: systems development 
and test evaluati on costs. 
B. Investment: installations, torpedo procurement 
cost, initial stock level costs, initial training, 




charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of 
Defense in the Nuclear Age (New York: Antheneum, 1966) p. 206 
2Niskanen, A Suggested Treatment of Time-Distributed 




















C. Operating Costs: torpedo attrition, refurbishment, 
test support, spare parts, training, retriever ship 
operating costs. 
l Costing the REC Torpedo 
27 
Research and Development costs are sunk costs for the REC 
torpedo. This is not a bias in favor of the present system 
as it may seem at first , but is rather a correct procedure for 
obtaining a rational look at the different weapon sys tems costs . 
All research and development work was completed by 1964 and the 
torpedo is part of a presently operational system with no antici -
pated future torpedo procurement. Funding for 1967 includes the 
final purchases of REC torpedoes and they will be continued in 
service until superceded or the large stockpile is expended. 
All assets except the torpedo retrieval boat are cons idered 
to have a zero market value and are valued as a sunk cost. 
The thirty TR boats, however, do have a market value of $250 , 000 
apiece (original cost of $500,000 less specialized equipment) 
and this $7.5 million is an investment expenditure of the first 
year of the planning period. 
The costing for the REC, then, is composed of investment 
and operating costs alone and will be explained by means of 
a cost equation. 
1
source of the data for the cost computations is the 
Quarterly Status of Torpedo Firings Reports, 1963, 1964, 1965, 
1966, prepared by the U.S. Naval Underwater Weapons Research 
ana-Engineering Station, Newport, Rhode Island; as well as 
interviews with U.S. Naval Ordnance Sys t ems Command, In-Service 






















c . OJ 
= Total amortized system cost f or the 
~C t orpedo for the planning period 
= Bas ic operating cost jth year 
= Refurbishment cost per recovered t orpedo 
= Cost of depot maintenance and s pare parts 
28 
= Cost of torpedo recovery ships (operating costs 







= Attrit i on cos t per t orpedo not r ecover ed 
= Total t orpedo retriever salvage value 
= Number of t ot a l fir i ngs per year during 
pl anning period (air and surface ves sels) 
= Planning year 
= I nt er est rate 
= Length o f planning period 




C0 j + .2x CA + .9C8 + . 8x CR + CD - V8 
(1 + r)J 
The letters in the equation represent the fo llowi ng cost 
breakdown. Basic operat i ng costs, C . , covers the Fl eet Exercise OJ 
Support, limited s pare parts requirements, and Proof and Test work 
t o maintain torpedo r eliabi lity at a pre-selected l eve l of 80 per 
cent . For t he firs t year only, C . includes the i nves tment OJ 





















the force. Refurbishment costs per recovered torpedo, CR' are 





We ights, lanyard, 
squibs & suspension bands 158 
Replacement of parts 50 
Labor (17.5 man hours) 35 
$1393 
Battery salvage -500 
$ 893 ~ $900 
CA' the cost of each torpedo attrited is equivalent in dollar 
value to the estimated initial basic procurement cost of the 
REC of $15,000. The .2x represents the expected rate of attrition 
times the number of total firings. 
The cost of torpedo recovery ships, .9C8 , requires 
further explanation. As previously stated in the chapter on 
basic assumptions, no costs are incurred by warship torpedo 
recovery since realistically the opportunity costs of such 
vessels, men, and equipment would be zero. c8 represents an 
aggregate annual operating cost of the 30 TR vessels presently 
in service, assuming a replacement of two of these vessels 





















of .9 recognizes the other uses to which these boats would be 
subjected along with their normal recovery duties such as rescue 
and util ity requirements. 
CD represents that portion of depot operations costs 
allocated to the REC and major spare parts requirements and is 
estimated at $1.5 million annually. C
0
j and CD collectively 
amount to $10 million annually. Table l gives a summary ' of results 
of the cost analysis for the REC. 
Costing the EXP Torpedo 
Beyong the basic assumptions of Chapter II certain costing 
assumptions are required to make the analysis more manageable. 
These are: 
1. EXP basic procurement cost is $10,600. 
2. EXP torpedoes are not stockpiled, but only those to be 
used are purchased each year. Thus salvage value at 
the close of the planning period is zero. 
3. In pr~duction procurement an 85 per cent learning 
curve is realized for annual production levels. 
4. Surface launch rate is constant at the same level 
as for the REC costing. 
5. Annual expenditure rate is considered constant 
throughout the planning period. 
6. While REC research and development is estimated 
1 
at $11.7 million over anine-year period, little 
R&D costs for the EXP are expected due to the 
basic assumption that the EXP is not a redesign 
concept but merely a less costly version of the 
present weapon. A cost of $2 million is assumed 
to cover research and development work for the EXP. 
R. N. Anthony, Management Accounting (Homewood, Illinois: 





















TABLE 11 ' 2 
REC TORPEDO COST DATA FOR 5 AND 10 YEAR PLANNING PERIODS 
AND 5 PER CENT AND 10 PER CENT DISCOUNT RATE 
TOTAL TOTAL NUMBER TOTALciR-~rffi~~~J (REC) 
NUMBER OF OF 
FIRINGS AIR LAUNCHES Discount Rate 
5% 10% 
0 0 78 . 9 67 . 6 
1057 57 114. 2 95.6 
1500 500 12 8 .7 106.1 
2000 1000 144.5 118 .7 
3000 2000 179. 2 145 .1 




0 0 31.2 30 . 2 
1057 57 50 . 2 46.7 
2000 1000 69.1 63.2 
3000 2000 89.1 80 .1 
1For periods in which no firings are conducted, the fixed 
cos ts associated with maintaining the capability to fire, if 
required, are incurred. For this r eason the total 10-year costs 
at a zero firing rate are still high. 
2Appendix B contains a sample cost calculation using 10 per 


























= Total amoritized system cost f or EXP 
t orpedo f or the planning period 
= Research and development costs, t otal 
(all considered a year one cost) 
= Procurement cost per t orpedo adjusted f or 
unit learning curve of 85 per cent, jth year. 
= Annual spare parts cost per 1000 t orpedoes 
= Annual test support to insure reliability 
(fixed cost) 
= Year of the planning period 
= Planning period length 
r = Interest rate 
32 
X = Number of t otal firings annually (air and surface) 
The cost equation f or the EXP becomes: 
+ xK ·) PJ 
In order to compute a t orpedo procurement cost, an additional 
assumptions must be made. Cost savings can be expected i n the 
system designed f or a single operation only over the cost of 
similar systems designed f or repeated usage due to a general 
lessening of tolerance, performance, and failure time specifi-
cations . Such savings which might be available by major t orpedo 
redesign are not considered, but savings available without 






















REC and EXP PROCUREMENT COSTS 
REC (Cost per Unit) 
$ 3,500 






$11 , 000 $ 6 ,600 
A total savings per torpedo is estimated t o be $4400 
and the EXP cost per torpedo becomes $10,600 . This figure 
is adjusted f or a unit learning curve of 85 per cent t o 
compute the K . values. Table 3 gives aggregate cost levels 
PJ 
f or the EXP at various expenditure rates , planning periods 
and discount rates. 
As expected for the EXP, operating cos ts fell markedly 
due to the absence of a recovery vessel requirement, associated 
manpower costs and refurbishment costs . Moderat e a t l ow 
expenditure levels but dominant at higher ones were t orpedo 






















EXP TORPEDO COST DATA FOR 5 AND 10 YEAR PLANNING PERIOD 
AND 5 PER CENT AND 10 PER CENT DISCOUNT RATE 
TOTAL TOTAL NUMBER TOTAL 10-YEAR COST (EXP) (in millions) NUMBER OF OF Discount Rate FIRINGS AIR LAUNCHES 5% 10% 
0 0 11.2 9.4 
1057 57 79.1 63 . 6 
1500 500 105.7 86.1 
2000 1000 136.5 110 . 9 
3000 2000 198 . 6 161.1 
4000 3000 270 . 9 212.2 




0 0 6.8 6.4 
1057 57 46.4 41.1 
2000 1000 84.2 74.9 
3000 2000 1 22 .6 108.7 
1Appendix B contains a sample cost calculation using 





















At this point in the analysis a new alternative is 
very apparent. With the present stockpile of REC torpedoes 
and with recovery cost of DD fired torpedoes zero, a joint 
usage is possible . The REC torpedoes presently available 
could be used by surface vessels only while the EXP type 
could be used by air units. The cost equation is a combination 
of the first two cost equations and is casted in Table 4 below. 
TABLE 4 
JOINT USAGE COST DATA 
TOTAL NUMBER TOTAL COST (JOINT USAGE) 
NUMBER OF in millions 
OF AIR 10 -YEAR 5-YEAR FIRINGS LAUNCHES 5% 10% 5% 10% 
0 0 69.0 58 . 7 24.7 24 . 2 
1057 57 105 . 2 86.3 49.5 45 . 3 
2000 1000 165. 134.8 85 . 7 76.8 
3000 2000 228.4 186.5 126.1 112.7 
This joint alternative, however, does not appear as a 
satisfactory alternative from the curve of Total Cost vs Total 
Firings, Figure l. The costing of the joint alternative is 
handicapped due to the fact it is saddled with the disadvantages 
of both pure alternatives and denied the advantages of either. 
Although the joint alternative does not have the TR boat costs, 





















attrition costs of the REC and the high procurement of the EXP. 
I t is only sli ghtly l ess costly than the present REC system up to 
slightl y more than the base number of surface fir ings (1000); 
that is, at about 300 air launchings per year it becomes the most 
costly possible alternative, and though initially investigated, 
was discarded as a possible alternative due t o the relative dominance 
of the pure type alternatives . This is demonstrated in Figure 1 
below for a 10-year planning period and a 10 per cent discount rat e . 
Figure 2 shows the Total Cos t vs Total Firings curves for 
the EXP and REC t orpedoes a t both 5 and 10 -year planni ng periods 
f or a 10 per cent d i scount r ate. Figure 3 shows thes e same curves 
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RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS 
Study Results 
It is evident that further work must be done in the derivation 
of the production function for the torpedo problem. The issues 
of incomplete data, misspecification, omitted variables, and 
multi-collinearity remain and without additional data and investi-
gation leave the validity of the production function open t o 
question. The hypothesis of the relationship between readiness 
scores and number of torpedo drops has not been proven or d i s proven 
and further investigation with more complete data is called f or. 
In order to continue the analysis and determine the efficiency 
problem presented, it is first necessary t o selec t a best production 
function from those ava ilable. Of the regressions computed, run 
number 261 is selected for a number of reasons. Although it does 
2 -2 2 -2 
not have the highest R or R , the R and R values are satisfactory 
compared to the other equations. Intuitively, the dummy variables 
are desirable to counter the bias resulting from squadron type 
and location evident from the raw data . Variables x6 and x7 
which did not demonstrate signif icance are not involved in t he 
equation. The equation, also, is in a total log form which seems 
intuitively to fit the type of data expected. Run 261 has the 





















Cobb-Douglas production funct i on, so that the coefficient of x9 
can be considered an elasticity with respect to the t orpedo drop 
input. The x1 through x5 variables are dummy variables and in 
effect are some constant depending upon the type squadron and 
its geographic location. The x9 coefficient shows that marginal 
productivity falls as · input grows. There is no asympototic level 
41 
of output beyond which output ·cannot grow (such as 100% readiness), 
but the rate of increase decreases at high levels of i nput. Hence 
Run 261 has a constant elasticity of output variation with r egard 
to the input of the number of torpedo launches. Runs 261, 137 
and 221 all give reasonably similar production functions, total 
cost and marginal cost curves. Run 261 appears t o be the best 
of these three and will be used as the production function for 
the analysis. 
This production function is in reality a group of five 
curves of identical slope1 f or each of the fiv e data bases (VPP, 
2 VPL, VSL, VSP and HSL). The production function is shown in 
Figure 4. For clarity of presentation only one of the dat a bas e 
production function curves will be used f or the remainder of the 
analysis, that of VPP, but it must be borne in mind that the 
analysis will be equally valid f or all of the data bases. They 
are images of one other shifted to higher readiness levels. 
1Although the five curves do not have precisely the identical 
slopes, they are identical for all practical purposes. The maxi-
mum slope difference is computed in Appendix C. 
2 The reader may wish to refer to page 15 where these data 

















































With this effectiveness function and the two cost fun ctions 
derived in Chapter IV, we are now ready to construct the total 
cost and marginal cost curves which were the objectives of the 
analysis. Table 5 is a compilation of readiness and cost data 
for the EXP and REC for a 10 year planning period and 10 per cent 
discount rate. The cost data is taken from Tables l and 3 . 
The corresponding readiness levels for VPP are computed using 
Run 261 as the effectiveness function. Resulting marginal cost 
computations are also included. 
Total 
TABLE 5 
VALUES OF TOTAL COST, MARGINAL COST AND READINESS 
FOR EXP AND REC ALTERNATIVES 
Total Cost Marginal Cost Per Cent 
Firings Readiness 
REC EXP REC EXP 
1057 95.6 63.6 - - 55.5 
1500 106.1 86.1 1.4 3.0 63.5 
2000 118.7 110.9 4.2 8.3 66.5 
3000 145.1 161.1 8.5 16.2 69.6 
4000 170.7 212.2 15.1 30.0 71.3 
Using the data of Table 5, Figure 5 can be constructed . 
Figure 5 is the Total Cost vs Effectiveness curve for VPP for the 
same 10-year Planning Period and 10 per cent Discount Rate and is 
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From Tabie 5 may also be constructed a total cost vs 
input curve which is shown as Figure 6. The EXP is the least 
cost system up to a t otal torpedo drop rate of approximately 
2400 t orpedoes a year. With the study assumption of 1000 surface 
launches, this would be equivalent to 1400 air-launched torpedoes 
annually which is approximately twice the maximum annual air- · 
launch rate observed during the period of the data for the study 
(through 1966). The Navy is at the present time operating in 
the range of the production function in which the EXP concept is 
least costly. To demonstrate this let us take as an example an 
annual air launch rate of 600; that is, 1600 total torpedo drops 
annually. This expenditure rate for VPP squadrons corresponds 
to a readiness score (average) of 64 per cent fr om Figure 4. 
To increase the torpedo expenditure level enough to justify the 
REC concept would require an increase in drop rate by another 800 
air l aunches per year. This would correspond to an increase 
45 
in average VPP squadron readiness from 64 per cent to 68 per cent, 
a 4 per cent readiness increase at an increased cost of $130 
million less $87 million or $43 million dollars (Figure 5). It 
must be noted that the increased cost is for an increase in 
peacetime readiness of 4 per cent for all U.S. Navy ASW squadrons, 
not just for VPP squadrons. Since the Navy is actually operating 
under the REC concept, it is paying approximately $109 million 
for the torpedo launch input to maintain present levels of average 
squadron readiness (for VPP = 64%). If the objectives of the 
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a saving of $22 million ($109 less $87 million) would be realized 
by shifting to an expendable torpedo concept. 
It is equally possible that the decision-maker may face a 
budget constraint and be bound by a dollar input rather than 
a desired level of output . Should he be bound by the approximate 
present expenditure level of $109 million, the decision -maker can 
determine his most efficient alternative from the total cost 
curves of Figure 5. At this cost he can expect a readiness level 
of 64 per cent using the REC torpedoes or an increased level of 
66.5 per cent with the EXP. 
47 
If the objectives of the decision-maker indicate that some 
future readiness increase is required, he must realize that the 
EXP concept is no longer an attractive alternative after readiness 
increases of about 4 percentage points above present levels. 
Up to 68 per cent the EXP concept is the least costly. With a 
current readiness level of VPP of approximately 64%, it can be 
seen that a 4 per cent increase in readiness makes the EXP no 
longer least costly. So if the decision-maker must hedge against 
possible future increases in required readiness levels, he must 
be aware of that point where he becomes indifferent between these 
two alternatives. However, such an across-the-board increase in 
peacetime squadron capability as 4 percentage points is a 
significant change in the readiness posture of fleet air units. 
The significance of even small changes will be made clear in 





















Another important and useful result of the analysis is to 
provide data to the decision-maker for the evaluation of trade-offs 
between cost and effectiveness in the solutions of higher level 
opti ons or alternatives than are addressed by the analysis itself. 
As we have determined from our total cost curves, increases in 
readiness come at some predictable cost. To perform a specified 
mission , fewer squadrons are required if they are all at a high 
state of readiness than would be required if all were at some lower 
s t ate . That is, we can accomplish some given object ive either 
with x number of units at a high readiness level or by some number 
of units less than x if the readiness level is increased for any 
reason . 
l evels. 
A cost is incurred to achieve the increase in readi ness 
A saving results from the permissible reduction in force 
levels. These costs and savings can be compared to determine 
if the mis s i on objective can be accomplished by a new force of 
fewer but more effective units at a reduction in total system cost. 
This is best illustrated by a hypothetical example. Let us 
suppose that the 57 ASW squadrons in the Navy are all operating 
at a readiness level of 60 per cent. (We are taking one production 
funct i on and one t ot al cost curve to represent all squadrons for 
the sake of simplicity). Further, let us assume that each 
squadron has a maximum flight rate of 17.5 sorties per time unit 
and the ASW sqaudrons have been assigned a mission (by the 
decision-maker) of flying 600 successful sor ties per time unit 
over an extended period. In order to fly these 600 successful 
sorties , the squadrons must fly 1000 total sorties since their 





















mission. The total required sortie rate rais e s each squadron 
to its maximum individual sortie rate of 17.5 mis s i ons per time 
unit ( ~ = 17.5) . 
What alternative method ex ists for completion of the mission 
with this same type of air unit ? The alternative i s t o i ncrease 
the readiness level of the air unit s so t ha t th e same output 
can be maintained with fewer air unit s . 
Let us suppose that, by increase ex penditure level of torpedoe s 
(either EXP or REC types), we raise the level of squadr on readiness 
to 61% for some finite cost. 
The number of sorties required at the increa s ed 
l evel for 600 successful missions falls from 1000 t o 
readiness 
984( 600 = 984). 
.61 
In order t o fly this number of sorties at the max imum poss ible 
rate of 17.5 sorties per squadron per unit time , only 56 s quadr ons 
would be required instead of 57 ( i~~5 = 56). Now it becomes 
an option of the decision-maker to decide whether by rais ing the 
level of readiness by some finite amount he can be equally 
eff ective in the accomplishment of some higher level requirement 
and at the same time reduce total system cost by cutting the 
number of squadrons required to perform the mission. 
The other comparison sought at the beginning of the analys i s 
is the Marginal Cost Curves. This marginal cost vs effectiveness 
is plotted in Figure 7 using the data of Table 5 f or VPP at a 
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It can clearly be seen that the marginal cost for the EXP is 
everywhere higher than the marginal cost for the REC concept. 
Nevertheless, the EXP is demonstrably the least cost concept for 
some portion of the output even though it has the higher marginal 
cost throughout. There is nothing magical here. Marginal cost, 
being the first derivative or slope of the t otal cost curve is 
implicitly shown on the Total Cost curves of Figure 5. It can be 
seen that for any effectiveness level the EXP total cost curve 
51 
has a greater slope than the REC total cost curve at the same level 
of effectiveness. This is the same as saying the EXP has a higher 
marginal cost throughout. The higher slope does not prevent the 
EXP total cost curve from being below the REC curve a s it is in 
fact in the lower levels of effectiveness in Figure 5. This demonstrates 
a pitfall of such ratio comparisons as marginal cost and that to make 
a decision on marginal cost values alone would be deceptive. Figure 
7 shows the decision-maker the incremental cost (saving) for increases 
(decreases) in readiness. 
Sensitivity 
One final step in the analysis remains: A sensitivity study 
of the cost analysis to determine the sensitivity of the results 
to discount rate, length of planning period and basic t orpedo cost. 
Using the planning period of ten years, a variation of the 
discount rate from 10 per cent to 5 per cent does not affect the 
results of the study; the break-even or cross-over input (total 





















systems cost for both concepts are proportionally higher with 
the lower discount rate and may throw some doubt on the desirability 
of any torpedo drop level above 0 due to the higher total cost. 
By varying the planning period from 10 to 5 years a very 
definite change in the results is evident. At this planning period 
length (at either 10 per cent or 5 per cent discount rate) the 
cross-over point for indifference between the two alternatives 
falls from the level of approximately 2400 to approximately 1400 
total firings which is equivalent to 400 air launches. At any 
launch rate above this rate of 400 air launches, the REC concept 
would be the least costly system. Since the present firing rate 
is above this range, if the decision-maker anticipates either 
maintaining or increasing squadron readiness capability he should 
favor under these assumptions, the REC concept. Although the 
analysis is critically dependent upon the planning period length 
selected and a short period favors the existing REC system, 
from past experience the 10-year planning period is a quite 
reasonable one as torpedo service life has in the past been 
generally close to or well above ten years. 
What happens to the study results when the value of the 
REC torpedo is varied? This is a most significant issue, particularly 
in view of the escalating costs prevalent in defense procurement 
and the increasing technology in all phases of armament with the 
resulting cost increases. Although the base cost of $15,000 is 
a realistic figure for the present air weapon, future weapons may 
cost much more. The analysis, as might be anticipated, is extremely 





















concept retains its advantages over a larger spectrum of the 
readiness scores. This sensitivity to basic torpedo cost is most 
appropriately demonstrated on the Total Cost vs Effectiveness curves 
of Figure 8. While the total costs of the REC remain relatively 
stable even with a tripling of basic torpedo costs, the EXP cost, 
both total and marginal climbs rapidly. By doubling the basic 
torpedo cost, the REC concept dominates at all desired readiness 
levels. The marginal cost of the EXP rises substantially with 
increases in the basic torpedo cost as might be anticipated. 
Hence once the practice torpedo takes on a cost of roughly 
twice the cost of the present practice weapon, the recoverable 
concept dominates at all readiness levels and corresponding torpedo 
firing rates. Only if the cost of the practice weapons can be 
retained near the $15,000 cost level does the EXP concept appear 
as an attractive alternative. 
Summary 
The problem presented at the outset of the study was to 
determine what the present concept of recoverable torpedoes offers 
in terms of cost over the spectrum of effectiveness levels compared 
to what the concept of an expendable torpedo might offer over the 
same range. This has been accomplished and presented in Figures 
5 and 7 as the Total Cost and Marginal Cost curves under the 
conditions specified by the assumptions of the study. These results 
along with the sensitivity tests provide to the decision -maker the 
necessary information from which he can draw a number of meaningful 
observations. 
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1. At the present levels of Readiness and torpedo 
expenditure rate the EXP concept is less costly 
an alternative than the REC. 
2. If present readiness levels are expected to be 
maintained or permitted t o decline, the EXP concept 
is a less costly alternative. If, however, the future 
demand calls for i ncreased training l evels and increased 
ASW squadron readiness levels, then caution must be 
exercised since the REC becomes the least costly 
alternative after an increase of squadron readiness 
levels of 4 percentage points. Such an across-the-board 
increase in ASW squadron's readiness of 4 per cent is a 
significant increase. 
3. Under conditions of a short planning period, or of high 
initial torpedo procurement cost, the REC concept 
dominates the alternatives and the EXP is no longer 






















SAMPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Following is a table of some of the r esulting runs of the 
regression analysis conducted with the a id of the Harvard Economic 
Research Project HTW Leas t Squares Regression Program on an IBM 
7094 computer. The three digit index number specifies the run, 
pass and step numbers of the regression. Dependent and independent 
variables are listed by subscript and are identified below : 
Independent Variables 
0 = computed intercept 
l = Pacific-based patrol squadron (VPP) dummy variable 
2 = Pacific-based carrier ASW squadron (VSP) dummy variable 









Atlantic-based carrier ASW squadron (VSL) dummy variable 
Atlantic-based helicopter ASW squadron (HSL) dummy variable 
Percent of torpedo hits 
log10 of percent of torpedo hits 
number of torpedo drops per squadron per year 
log10 of the number of torpedo drops per squadron per year 
number of torpedo drops per squadron per squadron 
aircraft per year 
l og of the number of torpedo drops per squadron per 






















12 = squadron's peacetime readiness score f or the year 
13 = .log10 of squadron's peacetime readiness score 
57 
The regression equations listed are in all cases for all data 
years except for the last two listing which are samples of 
regressions using just 1964 and 1965 data and are so identified 
in the table. 
-------------------
RUN DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT SLOPE STANDARD R2 - 2 NUMBER VARIABLE VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR R R d . f . 
Ru n Pass Step 
------- - - -
2 1 1 1 3 0 l. 81 92 . 01104 . 16 .14 . 38 98 
8 . 00635 . 00146 
2 2 1 13 0 l. 8075 . 01 4 .14 . 13 . 35 98 
9 . 07637 . 01895 
2 3 1 1 3 0 1. 8215 . 011 . 14 . 12 . 35 98 
1 0 .064 . 016 
2 4 1 1 3 0 l. 7054 . 04 7 .0 98 . 079 . 28 98 
11 .05 8 .01 8 
2 4 1 13 1 l. 7578 .014 . 45 . 41 . 64 94 
2 l. 8199 . 013 
3 1.8288 . 013 
4 l. 8761 . 013 
5 l. 8238 .018 
8 . 00 50 . 0012 
2 6 1 13 1 1.7440 .016 .44 .41 . 64 94 
2 l. 8096 .015 
3 l. 8185 .015 
4 l. 8652 . 015 
5 1. 8141 .0195 
9 .0632 . 0157 
2 7 1 13 1 1 . 759 . 0146 . 43 . 39 . 62 94 
2 1.8211 . 0144 
3 l. 8308 . 0141 
4 l. 8776 . 0139 
5 l. 8387 . 0170 
10 .048 .0131 
2 8 1 1 3 1 l. 6442 .039 . 43 . 39 . 63 94 
2 1 . 7093 . 039 
3 1 . 7199 . 040 
4 1.7699 . 039 Vl 
5 l. 7261 . 040 co 
11 . 053 . 0146 
-------------------
RUN DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT SLOPE STANDARD R2 :R2 NUMBER VARIABLE VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR R d . f. 
117 1 2 1 57 . 688 3 . 08 .47 .43 . 66 93 
2 65.787 2 . 90 
3 67.685 2 . 54 
4 75 . 710 2 . 75 
5 66.819 3 . 24 
6 . 29 43 2 . 9 
8 . 8642 . 187 
118 12 1 58 . 224 3 . 06 . 49 . 45 . 67 92 
2 66.596 2 . 90 
3 68.462 2 . 55 
4 76.702 2 .78 
5 63 . 6 79 3 . 67 
6 340 2 . 9 
8 2 . 2501 . 809 
10 -15. 4 8 . 7 
127 12 1 56.567 3 .57 . 47 . 43 . 65 93 
2 65.214 3 . 44 
3 66 .902 3 .1 5 
4 75.006 3.38 
5 66.155 3 . 63 
7 - . 6 584 1.68 
9 11.076 2 . 4 
128 12 1 55 . 232 11.98 .47 . 43 .65 92 
2 63.869 12.02 
3 65 . 568 11.86 
4 73 . 712 11.59 
5 64 . 949 10.95 
7 - .6 673 l. 69 
9 10.391 6 . 37 




RUN DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT SLOPE STANDARD 
R2 :R2 NUMBER VARIABLE VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR R d .f. 
1 3 7 1 2 1 55. 08 7 3 . 29 . 47 . 43 . 65 93 
2 63 . 803 3 . 09 
3 65. 763 2 . 78 
4 73 . 643 2 . 99 
5 64 . 967 3 . 45 
6 . 606 2 . 95 
9 1 0 . 826 2 . 38 
138 1 2 1 54 . 091 11. 90 . 47 . 42 . 65 92 
2 62 . 799 11. 93 
3 64 . 76 6 11. 78 
4 72 . 676 11. 49 
5 64 . 067 1 0 . 90 
6 . 59 2.97 
9 1 0 . 311 6.37 
11 .5092 5. 84 
148 1 2 1 58 . 71 7 3 . 47 . 49 . 45 . 67 92 
2 67 . 057 3 . 36 
3 68.82 7 3 . 04 
4 77. 1 44 2 . 29 
5 64 . 087 3 . 98 
7 - .1451 l. 64 
8 2 . 2493 . 80 
1 0 - 15 . 35 8 . 7 
172 1 2 0 67.844 2 . 78 . 19 . 17 . 40 97 
6 - 1 . 844 3 . 4 
8 1.0589 . 223 
173 1 2 0 67 . 913 2 . 80 . 19 .1 5 . 39 96 
6 -1. 811 3 . 4 
8 l. 2975 . 74 




RUN DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT SLOPE 
NUMBER VARIABLE VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 
l 92 1 2 0 68 . 347 
6 5 . 76 
( 64 data) 8 -2 . 31 
l17 12 1 62 . 872 
2 71.669 
(65 data) 3 67 . 363 
4 82 .551 
5 71.117 
6 - . 94 
8 . 5479 
1 0 - 3.3 
STANDARD 
R2 ERROR 
6 . 22 . 20 
6 . 9 
1. 30 
3 .49 .68 
3 .6 9 
3 .7 7 
3 . 68 





. 039 .19 


























SAMPLE COST COMPUTATIONS 
A sample cost computation f or both the REC and EXP will be 
carried out using a 10 per cent discount rate and a 10-year planni ng 
period. Source of the data for the cos t computations is the 
Quarterly Status of Torpedo Firings Reports, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 
prepared by the U.S. Naval Under water Weapons Research and Engineering 
Station, Newport, Rhode Island; as well as interviews with U.S. 
Naval Ordnance Systems Command, In-Service Torpedo Group personnel. 
REC Costing 




CREC =~ C0 j +.2XCA + .9CS + .8XCR +CD- VS 








Total amortized system cost for the REC 
torpedo f or the planning period 
Basic operating cost jth year 
Refurbishment c ost per recovered t orpedo 
Cost of depot maintenance and spare parts 
Cost of torpedo recovery ships (operating cos ts 
and replacement costs combined) 
Attrition cost per t orpedo not recovered 
Total torpedo retriever salvage value 
Number of total firings per year during 
planning period (air and surface vessels) 
Planning year 
r = Interest rate 





















Actual computation i s s i gnificantly s i mplif ied by fill i ng 
in the tabl eau below: 
SAMPLE REC TORPEDO COSTING (1 500 Annual Firings ) 
Year 
69 70 7i 72 73 74 75 76 
1. Research and 
Devel opment zer o 
2 . I nvestment 
TR Boat s 7.5 
TR Boat Sal vage 
3 . Operating Cos t s 
Depot Mai n . & 
Spar es 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Fleet Exer c i se 
Support (Proof 
& Test f or 80% 
Reliabil i t y ) 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Refurb ishment of 
1 200 t or pedoes 1.1 1.1 1.1 1. 1 1. 1.1 1.1 1. 1 
Torpedo Attrition 
300 torpedoes 4 . 5 4 . 5 4 . 5 4 . 5 4. c 4.5 4.5 4.5 
TR Operating 
Cost 1. 2 1. 2 1.2 1. 2 1. ~ 1.2 1. 2 1. 2 
TR Replac ement 
Cost 1. 0 1.0 1. 0 1. 0 l. C 1.0 1.0 1. 0 
Torpedo Salvage 
Va lue (60 00 
t orpedoe s ) 
Total Und i scount ed 25. 3 17. 8 17.8 17 .8 17. t 17.8 17 . 8 17.8 
Discounted 10% 23 .1 14 . 7 13.3 1 2. 1 ll. C lQO 9.1 8.3 











17.8 - 7. 7 





















Items in Year 69 will be used to explain the equation. 
Research and Development costs are considered sunk costs for 
the REC. C ., the basic operating costs cover $9 million for OJ 
proof and test work to maintain torpedo reliability at 80 per 
cent as well as fleet exercise support. This includes the costs 
for refurbishment and repair of extensively damaged exercise torpedoes 
and such items as periodic testing of inventory torpedoes as well 
as expenditures for preparation of practice weapons for fleet use. 
C ., in addition, includes the $7.5 million investment expenditure OJ 
f or the TR asset of the force for the first year of the planning 
period. The element CD equals $1 million which is the annual 
cost for depot maintenance and spare parts attributed to the REC. 
The element .2XCA represents the expected rate of attrition 
times the number of total firings times the attrition cost per 
torpedo not recovered. This is . 2( 1500)($15,000) 
= $4.5 million 
Similarly the element .8XCR represents the expected rate of 
recovery times the firing rate times the refurbishment cost per 
torpedo recovered. This is .8(1500)($900) 
= $1.1 million 
The element .9C8 is determined by the $1 million annual cost 
of TR replacement and the basic TR operating cost of $1.4 million. 
This is equal t o .9(1.4 + 1.0) = $2.2 million. 
The final element v8 , the salvage value, is computed using 
an exponential decay based upon the expected service life of the 
torpedoes of 10 years. Torpedo inventory is taken to be 9000. 
Thus it is assumed that the value of the asset at one-half the 




















cost, and at the end of the service life the estimated value 
would be 25 per cent of the original cost. Thus t orpedo salvage 
value is: ~($15,000)(9000-300(10)) 
=$22.5 million 
Similarly, TR salvage value is: ~ ($500,000)( 30 ) ~ $3 million . 
These annual costs are then di s counted at 10 per cent a s shown 
in the tableau and summed t o arrive a t the t ot a l cos t of $106.1 
million. 
EXP Costing 
The EXP cost equation is: 
m 




= Total amoritized system cost f or EXP 
torpedo for the planning period 
= Research and development cos t s , t otal 
(all considered a year one cost) 
= Procurement cost per t orpedo ad justed f or 
unit learning curve of 85 per cent, jth year 
= Annual spare part s cost per 1000 t orpedoes 
= Annual test support to insure reliability 
(fixed cost) 
= Year of planning period 
m = Planning period length 
r 
X 
= Interest rate 




















The actual computation will be simplified as with the REC 
costing by referring to the following tableau. 
SAMPLE EXP TORPEDO COSTING (1500 Annual Firings) 
Year 
69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 
1. Research and 
Development 2 . 0 
2. Investment 
Test Support for 
Reliability 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Maintenance and 
Spare Parts . 4 .4 .4 . 4 .4 . 4 .4 . 4 . 4 
3 . Operating Costs 
Torpedo Procurement 15.9 13.5 13.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 9 . 8 9.8 
Total Undiscounted 19 . 3 14.9 14 . 9 12 .9 12.9 12.9 12 .9 11.2 11. 2 
Discounted a t 10% 17.7 12 . 3 11. 2 8.8 8 . 0 7. 3 6.6 5. 2 
~ = $86.1 Million 
The elements of the equation can be explained in the 
f ollowing manner. ~' the Research and Development Costs are 
estimated at $2 million and are considered a year one cost. 
~ is estimated as $1 million annually while xKs 




= $.4 million for the annual cost of maintenance and 





9 . 8 
11. 2 





















Th e final e l ement , x K ., is the procurement c ost f or the 
PJ 
torpedoes fired each year adjusted f or an 85 per cent learning curve . 
The first year procurement costs are: 1500 ( $10 ,600 ) = $15.9 million . 
The learning curve takes place i n the second year reducing the 
procurement cost t o $14 .5 million (15.9 X . 85 = $13 .5 million). 
The next production saving takes place in year f our when the 
procurement cost is aga i n reduced t o $11.5 million and likewise 
it i s reduced t o $9 . 8 million in year eight. 
These annual cost are then discounted at 10 per cent as shown 
in the tableau and summed over the planning period t o arrive at the 




















PRODUCTION FUNCTION, RUN 261 
The pr oduction fu nction selected f or the analysis , 
Run 261, is a seri es of fiv e curves f or the five dat a bases . 
These cur ves diverge slightly as t he value of annua l t orpedo 
dr ops i s i ncreased , but f or practical purposes the slopes of 
the five curves a r e i dentical. 
Run 261 is 
l og R = 1.744X1 + 1. 80 96X 2 + 1. 818SX3 + 1. 86 52X4 + 1. 81 41X5 + . 0632X9 
Since x1 through x5 are dummy variables and x9 = l og x8 by 
definition, Run 261 may be written 
where K1 = a constant f or each curve but may t ake 
on five discrete values from 1.744 t o 
1. 86 52 
X ~_9 = 1 t o represent tha t dummy variable which 
has the value 1 
K2 = the constant .0632 






















R = lOKl x8 
K2 
The slope a t any point is: 
dR K K2 -1 
-- -
10 1 K2 X8 
dX 8 
Let K1 and K1 b be two different v a lues of K1 . ,a ' 
Substituting the greatest K1 spread f or Kl,a and Kl,b gives 
K2 - l ( 1.8652 1 . 744) 
= K2X8 10 - 10 
= .0632X8 . 0632 - l (73.31 - 55.46) 


















The higher the value of x8 , the lower the value of the slope 
difference. The maximum slope difference then will occur at the 
minimum x8 value of the production function which is x8 = l torpedo 
fired per squadron per year (1057 total firings annually). 
The slope difference is then 
= 1.12 (l)-. 9368 
= 1.12 
Degrees of Readiness 
Torpedoes Fired Per Squadron 
The slope of the l owest production function curve at x8 = l 
Slope 
Kl K2 - l 
= 10 x2 x8 
= 101.744 (.0632)(1)-.936 8 
= 55.46 (.0632) 
= 3.5 
Degrees of Readiness 
Torpedoes Fired Per Squadron 
is: 
70 
The slope of the highest production function curve at x8 = l is: 
K1 K2 - l 
Slope = 10 K2 x8 
= 101.8652 (.0632)(1)-.9368 
= 73.31 (.0632) 
= 4.62 Degrees of Readiness 





















This maximum difference in slope rapidly decreases in moving 
along the X axis . At x8 = 10 firings per squadron (which is 
equival ent to 1570 total firings annually) the slope of the l owest 
production function becomes: 
Slope= 101 · 744 (.0632)(10)-· 9368 
= 10" 8072 (.0632) 
= • 405 
Degrees of Readiness 
Torpedoes Fired Per Squadron 
The slope of the h i ghest curve is: 
Slope= 101 •8652 ( . 0632)(10)-· 9368 
= 10" 9284 (.0632) 
= .535 
Degrees of Readiness 
Torpedoes Pired Per Squadron 
71 
The difference in slope has fallen to .13 degrees of readiness torpedoes fired per squadron 
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